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difficult to document a belief that any
major Black leadership group purpose-
fully sought to retard the advance of the
race as a whole.
If current Black leadership (here the
reference is to the more visible and in
many ways more organizationally sound
leadership) is to be faulted, I would sus-
pect it could be in the area of erring on
the side of superficial unity. There has
been a tendency in recent years to play
down, to minimize the obvious differ-
ences that exist among the leadership
groups.
There should be more overt recogni-
tion on the part of the Black leadership
of fundamental differences between
them. There should be much more open
discussion of those differences, pin-
pointing precisely the issues of disagree-
ment. This is done more often privately
than publicly, and it should be surfaced.
This will not likely hurt the Black strug-
gle. On the contrary, it will likely help
it and give it a leadership credibility it
now seeks to sustain.
Like most of their Black constituents,
they (Black leaders) are not too far to the
left or right in American politics. To be
sure, they are liberal, but they are also
political pragmatists. They have every
intention of challenging racism in the
country, of pushing for more equitable
economic policies, and of trying to forge
viable coalitions with other groups that
share those goals. Some are more com-
fortable with their corporate connec-
tions than others would like them to be
or want to be themselves. They have ar-
rived at this 'place and time with a record
of action and achievement about which
they need not apologize. They remain
vulnerable to attacks from within and
without but they need not feel especially
apologetic about their failures. Their
failure to deliver certain benefits to their
constituents has been, as Dorothy
Height indicated, a function largely of
their circumstantial inabilities-not






With prime interest rates in December,
1980 surpassing the previous 20 percent
record of April, 1980, the economic
growth lagging, it is almost a certainty
that this nation will be sliding into an-
otherrecession in 1981.
Over the years, repeated cycles of re-
cessions have consistently eroded many
of the economic advances of Blacks.
During the past 26 years, this nation
has experienced a succession of at least
six recessions (1953-54, 1957-58, 1960-
61, 1969-71, 1974-75 and 1980). Before
Blacks had a chance to recover from one
recession, they were subjected to an-
other. Thus, the Black community is
still reeling from the cumulative effects
of a quarter century of recessions.
The peak unemployment rate of 7.8
percent during the 1980 recession was
significantly higher than the 7.3 percent
average jobless rate for the peak of the
preceding six recessions. In fact, based
on the level of unemployment, Blacks
were more severely impacted by the
seven-month 1980 slump than they were
by the 17-month 1974-75 recession-
which all analysts agree was the most
devastating decline since the Great De-
pression of the 1930s.While the number
of unemployed white workers declined
by 562,000 between 1975 and 1980,
there were 200,000 more Blacks unem-
ployed in 1980 (at 1.7million) than there
were at the peak of the 1974-75 reces-
sion (at l.5 million).
The official jobless rate forBlack teen-
agers was 36 percent, while the official 9
number of unemployed Black teenagers
was about 364,000. But the National
Urban League Hidden Unemployed In-
dex placed the actual jobless rate for
Black teenagers at 59 percent in 1980
and the actual number of unemployed
Black teenagers at more than double
(about 800,(00) the official level. It is
also important to point out that while 59
percent of Black teenagers may be un-
employed as a national average, in spe-
cific inner-city areas the actual jobless
rates for Black youth may be closer to
80-90percent.
In every work category, Black youths
were more willing to work at lower pay-
ing jobs than either Hispanic or white
youths. For example, one-third (34 per-
cent) of Black youth were willing to
wash dishes at $2.50 an hour, compared
to 24 percent of Hispanic and 19 percent
of white youth. Similarly, almost half
(44 percent) of Black youth were willing
to work at a hamburger place at $2.50 an
hour, compared to 33 percent ofHispanic
and 28 percent of white youth. These
findings indicate that it is white, not
Black youth who are least willing to
accept lower paying jobs.
A more recent analysis of employ-
.ment pattems by the National Urban
League revealed that Blacks, Hispanics
and Asians were less likely than whites
to secure their proportionate share of
new jobs. For example, while Blacks
accounted for 15 percent of the increase
in the total U. S.working-age population
between 1975-80, they obtained only
10 percent of the 12.5 million new jobs
over that period. Similarly, while His-
panics made up 15percent of the growth
in the total working-age population be-
tween 1975-80, they got only 11 percent
of the new jobs. On the other hand,
whites obtained three-fourths (74 per-
cent) of the new jobs over the last five
years, although they accounted for only
64 percent of the growth in the working-
age population. And white women se-
cured over half of the new jobs, while
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10 compnsing only one-third of the in-
crease in the working-age population.
There is no persuasive evidence that
a new sub-minimum youth differential
should be enacted, when: (a) the major-
ity of teenagers are already being paid
below the minimum wage; (b) a legal
sub-minimum differential already ex-
ists; (c) the majority of businesses are
not even taking advantage of the exist-
ing youth differential; and (d) Black
youth would be the least beneficiary
from a broader differential. These facts
strongly suggest that many of the pro-
ponents of a youth sub-minimum wage
may be less interested in hiring more
teenagers (whether Black or white) and
may be more interested in eliminating,
or severely undermining, the minimum
wage for adults.
Sharp increases of Blacks in higher-
level occupations are even more remark-
able because they occurred in the midst
of two devastating recessions. Clearly,
affirmative action mandates must be
given much of the credit for these im-
pressive employment gains by Blacks in
a very unfavorable economic climate. In
fact, even these data sharply understate
the actual impact of affirmative action,
since they only focus on shifts of Blacks
between broad occupational categories
and not on movement within occupa-
tions. Thus, for example, these data do
not reveal at all the number of Blacks
who were promoted within professional,
managerial or sales occupations.
The income gap between Blacks and
whites widened in every region during.
the 1970s. The sharpest declines in the
Black-to-white income ratio occurred
in the Northeast (from 71 percent to 58
percent) and in the West (from 77 per-
cent to 62 percent) between 1970 and
1979, while the ratio fell from 73 per-
cent to 63 percent in the North Central
region and from 57 percent to 56 per-
cent in the South.
The primary reason for the widening
income gap between Black and white
families has been the steady decline in
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multiple-earners in Black families, while
multiple-earners in white families have
increased. Between 1970 and 1979, the
proportion of Black families with two or
more earners fell from 54 percent to 47
percent, while the proportion of white
families with two or more earners rose
from 53 percent to 57 percent. Of course,
this was due to the sharper increase of
working wives in white than Black
families.
The number of non-poor Black fami-
lies increased just as fast as the number
of poor families, while the number of
non-poor Black individuals rose some-
what faster than the number of poor
Black persons during the 1970s. As a re-
sult, the proportion of all Black families
that were poor remained unchanged at
28 percent between 1969 and 1979,
while the proportion of all Black indi-
viduals who were poor decreased slightly
from 32 percent to 31 percent. Thus, the
number of "under-class" Black families
and persons has increased over the past
decade, while their proportion has re-
mained the same. Consequently, these
findings do not support the popular no-
tion of a widening economic cleavage in
the Black community.
A major reason why Black businesses
have been lagging behind the total U. S.
businesses over the past decade is be-
cause they have been disproportionately
impacted by periodic recessions and
soaring interest rates. The rising inter-
est rates from commercial loans have
particularly affected Black businesses,
since like all small businesses they have
greater difficulty paying off loans at
much higher interest rates than when
they originally took out the loan.
Any economic development strategy
for inner-city areas should definitely
build on and utilize the expertise that
such (minority) groups have demon-
strated. Many of them have proven to be
very effective in working with the pri-
vate sector and in developing viable
business enterprises. What most of them
need are additional resources. In short,
no strategy for enhancing the economic
well-being of inner-city areas will be ef-
fective unless it builds on the already-
existing economic and job development
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